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this school argue that staff in the Foreign Office discriminated against the Republic because they hailed from privileged backgrounds, worried deeply about the threat of communism and preferred victory by General Franco to the survival of the reformist Republican government which they viewed as opening the door to revolution. 8 Historian Tom Buchanan has shifted attention away from the ideological prejudices coursing through Whitehall and instead has looked at the emotive and humanitarian response of British front-line diplomats to the horrors of war. Buchanan argues British diplomatic officials as a rule were guided in their humanitarian work by a sense of 'honour, even-handedness, and sympathy for all the victims of the civil war'. He also emphasises the autonomy of consuls from policy makers in London. 9 His approach brought a new focus, but to advance the historiography further we need to re-think the actions of British diplomats in Spain in a number of ways.
Ironically, Buchanan concentrated his study of diplomatic fair play on the help extended to supporters of General Franco in the government zone. As a result, he devoted significantly less attention to the rescue of government supporters in danger of falling into rebel hands. 10 Moreover, while he discussed the danger that Franco supporters faced from revolutionary murderers behind government lines, he did not examine the killings carried out by Francoist death and firing squads. In fact, government supporters suffered far more than Francoists and a large body of literature, which Buchanan did not draw upon, has emerged since the 1980s and demonstrates that the Franco regime killed at least 130,000 presumed opponents while in government-held territory around 50,000 people were murdered. 11 Moreover, while
Buchanan accorded some importance to UK-sponsored maritime evacuations of those in danger from violence behind the lines, in reality he only studied them in passing. In addition,
Buchanan similarly neglected Spanish documentary sources that reveal much about the actions of British consular officials on the front-line.
Accordingly, to advance our understanding we have to place evacuation work in the context of Francoist violence by drawing on British and Spanish sources. We particularly need to improve our knowledge of British government maritime evacuations. Given the impressive size of the Royal Navy and Spain's extensive coastline and the large numbers involved, the British government enjoyed ample opportunities to rescue those in peril. At present, however, while a significant body of literature exists on British voluntary humanitarian work on behalf of government supporters, we know far less about British-government-backed evacuations by sea. 12 Moreover, the current humanitarian literature concentrates on the evacuation of children at risk from bombing and neglects attempts to save adults in danger from the violence behind the lines. It is true that we can count on the valuable work of scholar James
Cable who studied UK involvement, and particularly the role of the consul Ralph Stevenson, in the evacuation of Basque refugees from Republican-held territory in the spring of 1937. 13 Cable's work, however, does not discuss the British-backed evacuations that took place in 1936; those which occurred in the summer of 1937; or the rescue efforts made at end of the war in March 1939.
By studying these neglected evacuations, we can gain new knowledge, bring a fresh focus to the literature and reveal the complexities underlying generalisations about the fair play of front-line diplomats. In terms of complexity, study of these evacuations reveals that British naval protection outside Spanish territorial waters allowed tens of thousands of government supporters to escape. In reality, however, many of the evacuations relied on private rather than government initiatives. We should also remember that the Royal Navy only went into action once the refugees had run the gauntlet of Francoist warships patrolling inside territorial Other consuls, however, proved extremely pro-Francoist and particularly after the military coup decimated Republican policing services and led to the arming of many workers. In these circumstances, left-wing gunmen began to settle accounts accrued over many years of struggle with employers. For their part, revolutionaries keen to destroy the power of the Church murdered priests (close to 7,000 religious were murdered) some of whom suffered castration and other forms of ritual mutilation. 27 Iconoclasts also consigned sacred images to the flames. 28 In a range of cases, committees set up by left-wing political organizations to control local areas in the wake of the collapse of the state turned a blind eye while revolutionaries slaughtered people suspected of supporting the revolt. 29 In a number of 7 instances, members of the local committees were themselves responsible for murders. 30 By the end of 1936, however, most of the killings had come to an end and the government authorities had re-established order. 31 The slaughter influenced some UK consuls such as Franco's emergency summary military courts that they insisted on changing some of the judges and reducing the number of death sentences.
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The Republican government attitude towards humanitarianism and evacuation
The willingness of the Republican government to collaborate in humanitarian work provides a crucial factor in explaining British success in helping Francoists. In Madrid, for instance, the British embassy maintained at least five houses in the Spanish capital where supporters of the rebels and Francoists were given refuge with the acquiescence of the government authorities. 39 Particularly audaciously, Captain E. Lance, working out of the British embassy in Madrid in the early part of the war, spirited rightists from the city to the ports of Valencia and Alicante. Revealingly, Lance persuaded the Republican authorities to supply him with trucks and drivers to ferry his refugees to Valencia and Alicante. He also drew on his personal relationship with the Republican foreign minister, Julio Álvarez del Vayo, to call on a police detachment to escort those under his protection through a cordon of workers' militia guarding the port. 40 Some of the refugees made it through the cordons by dressing in British uniforms and all of them escaped in UK ships. 41 Similarly, from June 1937 the Spanish government allowed the evacuation of all women, children and males under the age of seventeen or over the age of forty-six from Madrid.
Responding to the opportunity, the British consulate in Madrid set up an evacuation office where people afraid to register with the government authorities could offer their details to the This included all 120 members of the Madrid Order of the Sacred Heart of Jesus. From the eastern port, they were evacuated on the British chartered ships. 43 British officials did have reason, however, to be wary of the government side. The
Republican authorities, for instance, arrested Captain Lance, sentenced him to death and only released him in early 1939. 44 Similarly, in August 1937 the Republicans had tried to cajole the unbending Francoist side to allow the evacuation of government supporters stranded in
Santander by cutting off electricity and other supplies to the embassies where insurgent refugees had found sanctuary. 45 Unsavoury precedents also haunted the minds of British officials. The Turkish legation, for example, suffered an assault and rightists seeking refuge there found themselves consigned to Republican prisons. 46 The British also knew that two particular moments could lead to the slaughter of Francoist prisoners: bombing raids and the imminent collapse of the Republican front. In Málaga on 22
August 1936, for instance, rebel planes bombed the city's oil storage facilities. In revenge, a large crowd that included some police officers stormed the local prison and dragged off fortyfive right-wing prisoners to their deaths. 47 That said, the massacre of prisoners declined from the start of 1937 and the well informed British officials on the ground realised that the danger was not as great as it had been in the first months of the conflict. A telling example comes from Bilbao. On 4 January 1937, a mob including trade union and militia elements murdered over 200 prisons in jails in the city after a bombing raid. 48 Although the Basque authorities proved tardy in responding, they had by late evening brought the situation under control and later prepared prosecutions against sixty-one people. 49 As Sir Henry Chilton, the British ambassador working just over the border in Hendaye and often viewed as deeply antiRepublican, pointed out the Basque government was ferrying large numbers of troops from the front line to maintain order. He further carefully noted the role of the insurgent bombing in sparking the violence. 50 Despite the repetition of the bombing raids, however, the measures taken by the Basque authorities meant the prison massacres did not occur again.
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The British also feared that Republican defeat could lead to slaughter. Nevertheless, the This inflexible British attitude left supporters of the Spanish government to rely on their own resources. The Republican-supporting Basques, for instance, chartered eight vessels at their own expense to evacuate supporters. 79 That said, they deliberately chartered British merchant ships in the hope that if the Francoist navy tried to interfere with the vessels, the Royal Navy would sail to the rescue. 80 As we have seen, despite some initial reluctance, the UK government eventually offered Royal Navy protection on the high seas to these craft. This left a number of brave captains and crew, working for handsomely rewarded shipping owners, to hazard the three-mile-water zone where they could be fired upon and captured by waiting Francoist vessels. 81 Similarly, in the twilight of the war, the Republican government had to work with the shipping business France Navigation, a French Communist Party company contracted by the Republican prime minister, Juan Negrín, to arrange evacuations and, as we shall see, at this point the British did not provide the crucial protection needed to allow the ships out to sea. August. 93 Although his pro-consul, Ángel Ojanguren, was on the spot, British officials used
Bates' absence to argue that with no consul on the ground it would prove impossible to make an equitable selection of Republicans and Francoists for evacuation. 94 The stipulation badly affected the evacuations from Santander from late June 1937. With no consul on the ground, the equality rule could not be enforced and so the Royal Navy would not provide protection on the high seas. In June 1937, for instance, five British ships with accommodation for 8,000
refugees were anchored in Santander harbour waiting for a guarantee of a British naval escort. 95 Although it was Foreign Office policy to evacuate consuls at times of perceived danger, the backbench independent MP Eleanor Rathbone pointed out it 'is difficult to believe that any British Consul would have resented exposure to risk for such a purpose'.
96
British humanitarian volunteer Commander Harry Pursey, however, was on the ground and tried to make up for the absence of the consul. This future backbench Labour MP for Hull and described variously as representing the International Red Cross, the Chief for Basque
Evacuation was also known to be seeking an entry into the world of journalism. 97 Pursey argued that he could draw on his experience in evacuating refugees in the Russian Civil War to carry out the selection that Bates could have made had he been on the ground. The British remained tight-lipped about his offer. 98 Pursey eventually escaped from Gijón navigating an open boat loaded with a number of refugees through the Francoist blockade for ten hours. British diplomats enjoyed permission from London to take action to rescue prisoners of political importance in grave peril. 101 Those guarding the hostages were also to be rescued.
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To put the deal into practice, Captain Tronsco, Jesús María de Leizaola, a leading figure in the PNV, and Consul Bates all boarded HMS Keith in St. Jean de Luz to sail to Santander.
Once on board the British warship, however, Bates gave Leizaola to understand that he knew nothing of the deal. At Santander Leizaola states that he tried to persuade Bates to take on 150 Basque leaders (the number the Basques believed the destroyer could accommodate), but the consul replied that this was too many. In response, Leizaola offered to reduce his number to fifty, to which Bates remained silent. Only when they arrived off Santander did Bates tell him that no more than seventeen leaders, in equal number to the quantity of prisoners they believed to be held by the Basques, would be taken off. At this point, Leizaola, in a heartwrenching moment, had to turn away around forty of his fellow Basques begging him to do something for them. 103 The captain of the Keith reported that he had rescued ten hostages, six guards and nineteen 'Basque government officials'. Bates refused to use his discretion to save those in grave peril and the captain of the Keith supports Leizola's claims by noting that he had turned away 'about forty' Basques. 104 The consequences soon arrived and on the 14
October 1937 six Basque nationalists, including some of the important leaders, went before a Francoist firing squad. 105 
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The point about these evacuations in the summer and autumn of 1937 is not that the British operating in international waters did not help thousands escape. Indeed, the Manchester Guardian reported, for instance, on 27 August 1937, for instance, that 10,000 refugees had arrived in France from Santander in the previous forty-eight hours. 106 We also know that 'as many as 11,000 refugees from Gijón arrived in France in just a few hours in the autumn of 1937'. 107 Historian James Cable places the figure for the total number who escaped northern Spain at 100,000 with 89,000 of them enjoying Royal Navy protection on the high seas.
Spanish diplomat Javier Rubio puts the figure even higher and cites French press reports stating that by November 1937 130,000 refugees had arrived in France from northern Spain. 108 We need to bear in mind, however, that these evacuations were neither initiated nor sponsored by the British. Moreover, UK consular officials often hampered rather than supported evacuation efforts and they did so when the British were battling for Franco's March, the French handed over the ships to the Francoists. 119 The loss of these vessels cost the Republic dear because they offered one of the few ways of escorting refugee ships through the net cast by Franco's warships hovering outside territorial waters.
Casado also hoped to negotiate with Franco and his head of evacuation, Antonio Pérez García, working on an understanding that his opponents would allow an evacuation from eastern ports, did not start work until 26 March 1939. Pérez, however, commanded few ships, had little money to charter foreign vessels and wanted for diplomatic missions overseas to broker deals.
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The Paris-based International Committee of Co-ordination and Information for Republican Spain, however, had arranged ships to help with evacuation. Towards the end of the war, it created the International Delegation for Spanish Evacuation and Relief. 121 Relying on its own resources, this delegation had access to three vessels under the control of France Navigation.
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These included the Winnipeg which had capacity for up to 6,000 people and the Ploubazlanec which could accommodate over 1,000. 123 It also enjoyed permission from the Mexican government to transport the refugees to this sympathetic country. The three ships lay off Alicante waiting to pick up Republicans assembled in good order on the docks in numbers estimated between 4,000-12,000. 124 The last ship inside the harbour, the British merchant vessel the Stanbrook had left Alicante at 11.00 pm on 28 March with over 2,600 refugees crammed aboard. 125 Distrusting the Francoist navy, however, the captains of the French vessels outside the harbour kept their distance from territorial waters and awaited a naval escort that would guarantee their safety. waiting for a promised U.K. warship that never arrived. 135 The International Delegation reported that such actions meant that instead of rescuing a possible 6,500 people they could help no more than 650 escape. 136 The 
